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BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE FOR DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS

HONGLEI ZHANG

ABSTRACT
The growing reliance on online services imposes a high dependability
requirement on the computer systems that provide these services. Byzantine fault
tolerance (BFT) is a promising technology to solidify such systems for the much needed
high dependability. BFT employs redundant copies of the servers and ensures that a
replicated system continues providing correct services despite the attacks on a small
portion of the system. In this dissertation research, I developed novel algorithms and
mechanisms to control various types of application nondeterminism and to ensure the
long-term reliability of BFT systems via a migration-based proactive recovery scheme. I
also investigated a new approach to significantly improve the overall system throughput
by enabling concurrent processing using Software Transactional Memory (STM).
Controlling application nondeterminism is essential to achieve strong replica consistency
because the BFT technology is based on state-machine replication, which requires
deterministic operation of each replica. Proactive recovery is necessary to ensure that the
fundamental assumption of using the BFT technology is not violated over long term, i.e.,
less than one-third of replicas remain correct. Without proactive recovery, more and more
replicas will be compromised under continuously attacks, which would render BFT
v

ineffective. STM based concurrent processing maximized the system throughput by
utilizing the power of multi-core CPUs while preserving strong replication consistency.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In today's society, Internet has become an irreplaceable part in people’s life and
online services are playing a more and more important role. Naturally, the services are
expected to be highly available despite arbitrary faults (referred to as Byzantine faults
[34]). To achieve high availability, the system should always be ready to provide correct
services to its clients even if a small portion becomes Byzantine faulty.
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) is a promising state-machine based replication
technique. However, existing BFT algorithms, proposed so far in [13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 68],
can only deal with applications with deterministic operations or those with the simplest
types of replica nondeterminism. To handle replica nondeterminism found in practical
applications, the BFT algorithm has to be improved in order to prevent the system from
being exploited due to the presence of replica nondeterminism. In chapter 3, we introduce
a set of mechanisms to control different types of nondeterminism for Byzantine fault
tolerance.
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BFT algorithms assume that less than one-third of the replicas can be faulty.
Without additional mechanisms, this assumption could not hold over long-run because
adversaries would continue trying to compromise more and more replicas. To prevent
this from happening, various proactive recovery schemes [13, 15, 48, 53, 54, 55] for BFT
have been proposed. Common to all such schemes, the replicas are proactively restarted
before it is known that they have become faulty. After analyzing the existing proactive
recovery schemes, we noticed three issues. First, rebooting with a refreshed state may not
be effective in repairing a replica if there are hardware damages. Second, even if a
compromised replica can be repaired by rebooting, it usually is a prolonged process,
which may cause the system to be unavailable during the recovery period. Third, all
active replicas need to coordinate such that only a small portion of the replicas are
undergoing recovery at any given time to ensure the completion of the recovery. In
chapter 4, we present an alternative way for proactive recovery based on service
migration. Our objective is to provide proactive recovery for long-running BFT systems
while effectively controlling of all three issues.
With the combination of BFT and proactive recovery, distributed applications can
be made more trustworthy. However, in existing BFT algorithms, all application requests
have to be executed sequentially to ensure strong replica consistency. This inevitably
imposes a severe limitation on the performance of BFT systems. In particular, they
cannot fully exploit the power of modern multi-core processors which is pervasively
available today. This issue has been addressed by a number of researchers [28, 19, 17,
60]. This limitation can be lifted by enabling concurrent execution by incorporating the
software transactional memory (STM) technique into BFT systems. By using the
2

software transactional memory model for processing, it is possible to delivery multiple
requests for concurrent execution as long as the commit order is controlled such that the
order conforms to the total ordering of the requests that triggered the transactions. The
software transactional memory technique can be further used to work with the speculative
BFT algorithm [68]. With commit barrier and multi-version support, a request is
delivered for speculative processing even if there are some conflicts. While most of the
time the speculation works, it would require an abort and restart if the speculation is
wrong. In chapter 6, we present our STM based speculative concurrent BFT framework
which significantly improved the overall performance.
Finally, the conclusion and future work are described in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

This chapter provides an overview of a number of topics that this dissertation
research has been involved with, including Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), strong
replica consistency, software transitional memory (STM), concurrent and speculative
execution, and concurrency control.

2.1

2.1.1

Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Byzantine Fault

The term "Byzantine fault" was coined by Lamport [34] as part of the classic
coordination problem known as the Byzantine Generals Problems. A Byzantine fault
refers to an arbitrary fault that may occur during the execution of a distributed system
which may lead the system to an arbitrary failure state. A Byzantine fault may make the

4

system respond to a client's request in an unpredictable way, such as crash, executing
incorrect instructions, or processing the right instructions with wrong order. Compared
with fail-stop faults, Byzantine faults are much harder to detect and, even worse,
Byzantine faulty components may collude together, which could make the detection of
such faults much harder.

2.1.2

Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Byzantine fault tolerance refers to the capability of a system to tolerate Byzantine
faults. It can be achieved by replicating the service and ensuring all service replicas to
reach Byzantine agreement on all state transitions. Byzantine agreement refers to the
procedure that ensures all correct components reaching a consensus despite the presence
of Byzantine failures.
The first highly efficient Byzantine agreement algorithm was introduced by
Castro and Liskov [13, 14] (referred to as the BFT algorithm or Byzantine Agreement).
This algorithm requires at least

replicas to tolerate up to

Byzantine faulty

replicas ( refers to the number of faulty nodes). During anytime of the execution, one
replica is designated as the primary while the rests are played as backups. The BFT
algorithm includes two modes of operations: normal operation, used to reach Byzantine
agreement, and view change, used to handle the primary failures.
The normal operation involves three phases executed sequentially, followed by
the execution order, they are called pre-prepare phase, prepare phase, and commit phase.
In the pre-prepare phase, the primary multicasts a pre-prepare message to all backups as
5

its proposal. If a backup accepts the message, it starts the second phase, i.e. prepare
phase, by multicasting a prepare message. When a replica has collected

matching

prepare messages from different replicas, it concludes the prepare phase. Then the replica
goes into the commit phase by multicasting a commit message to other replicas. The third
phase ends when a replica has received

matching commit messages from

different replicas. Figure 1 shows the details of BFT algorithm in the normal operations
with

.
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Figure 1 Normal Operation of the BFT Algorithm (

)

If a replica cannot complete the three-phase algorithm by a predefined time or it
receives an invalid message from the primary, it initiates a view change by sending out a
view change request to all replicas to try to select a new primary in a round-robin fashion.
If a correct replica receives

view change requests, it will join in even it is in normal

operation state. The view change can be concluded when

replicas agree on the

view change requests and then a new view will be established with a new primary. View
change is necessary to guarantee Byzantine agreement can eventually be reached among
all correct replicas.
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2.2

Strong Replica Consistency

The BFT algorithm described previously ensures the consistency of all correct
replicas despite Byzantine faults only when the replicas behave deterministically.
However, many practical distributed systems exhibit nondeterministic behaviors.
The antagonistic terms determinism and nondeterminism are from philosophy and
have been extensively used in different areas. The following definition of determinism is
from Wikipedia
“Determinism is the philosophical position that for every event exist conditions that
could cause no other event.”[30]
In computer science, an operation is said to be deterministic only when with the
same input from an initial state, in absence of any failures, it always concludes to the
same output. Deterministic operations are predictable. No matter how many times they
are repeated, the results of a deterministic operation should always be consistent. In the
domain of distributed systems, the term “replica determinism” means that when the same
sequence of operations are applied at the replicas in the absence of failures, all server
replicas should produce identical outcomes and move from the same initial state to the
next consistent state. Replica determinism is a system wide property which is used to
ensure all service replicas behave correctly even when they are running on completely
different machines.
Replica nondeterminism, on the other hand, is not predictable. Even start from the
same initial state in a failure free environment, server replicas still might perform
differently with applying the same set of requests in exactly the same order. Nowadays,
7

nondeterminism plays more and more important roles in web applications or services. For
example, many online gaming applications contain nondeterminism whose values
proposed by one replica and cannot be verified by others (e.g., random numbers that
determine the state of the applications). As another example, multi-threaded applications
may exhibit nondeterminism (e.g., the thread interleaving) whose values cannot be
determined prior to the execution of a request (without losing concurrency). All
nondeterminism or replica nondeterminism should be carefully handled in web
applications and services to ensure strongly consistence in the Byzantine fault tolerance
system.

2.3

Software Transactional Memory

Software Transactional Memory (STM), as an alternative way to lock-based
synchronization, is a concurrent control mechanism to protect the critical sections and
guarantee transaction atomicity during concurrent processing in the multi-thread
environments.
Lock-based synchronization mechanisms require the key to grant access to the
protected section. A processing thread acquires the key before entering and releases the
key after it finishes the operations in the protected section. If the key has been granted by
a transaction, all later transactions will be blocked until the key has been released. Then
the next transaction can request the key. In this way, the system is protected with mutual
exclusions on critical sections. STM, on the other hand, allows concurrent access and
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resolves the dependence problem dynamically. A thread can tentatively read or write the
same shared memory regardless of what other threads might be doing and only makes the
changes permanent after the validation is done during the commit phase. Otherwise, if
conflicts have been detected, related transactions might be aborted and restarted until
there is no more conflict.
There is no absolute sense of which solution is better between lock-based
synchronization and STM since they thrive in different environments. STM enables
optimistic concurrency, but adds the validation and retry overhead. This overhead highly
depends on the number of shared objects the transaction has read, and grows linearly with
the increases of the number of shared objects. With simpler and less error prone, STM is
a better choice in the normal situation and it allows multiple threads to work on same
pieces of data simultaneously. In the worst case, theoretically, the time complexity of
STM is linear which will be the total time of all transactions plus the overhead associated
with them.

2.4

Concurrent and Speculative Execution

In the last decade, the microprocessor technology has made tremendous advances.
Now, it is very common that servers are equipped with multi-core Central Processing
Units (CPUs) and sometimes with even multiple CPUs with great power of executing
program instructions simultaneously. Parallel (concurrent) computing and concurrency

9

control are widely used in all areas in computer science to improve overall system
performance.
Concurrent execution (concurrent computing) becomes a form of computing for
which the programs are designed as collections of process units that can be executed
simultaneously. Concurrent execution can be enabled on a single core CPU machine by
interleaving the executions in a time-slicing or priority ordering way, but more ideally, it
should be run on a multi-core machine with real parallelism at multiple cores by
assigning the different process units to different computational cores. Parallel computing
programs are much harder to design than the sequential programs. The challenges in
concurrent execution design include not only making the processing more efficient, but
also performing sound concurrency control, such as controlling the correct sequence of
the interactions, accesses to shared resources. Concurrent executions are also hard to
verify because they introduce several new obstacles that only exists in parallel computing
such as race conditions, and these bugs are hard to detect since they only happens on
special conditions. With concurrent execution and appropriately control, the overall
system performance is optimized to a new level.
Speculative execution further extends the idea of optimization, where the system
pre-executes the programs to utilize the CPU power more efficient. The pre-executed
tasks might not even be actually needed. Speculation is using CPU idle time to pre-do
work before the work is confirmed to be necessary, so as to prevent a delay for executing
time after usage confirmation. The pre-execution takes risk. If it turns out that the work is
not needed after all, the pre-execution will be wasted and totally ignored. The objective
of speculative execution is to further improve the performance by utilizing extra
10

resources beyond the requirements. It is being widely used in optimistic concurrent
computing. However, if the unnecessary speculation takes mandatory resources, it, will
slow down the whole process and waste the time and resources.

11

CHAPTER III
RELATED WORK

3.1

Related Work of Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [13, 14] by Castro and Liskov
ensures both safety and liveness provided that less than one third of the replicas become
faulty. Since this seminal work of BFT [13, 14] is published, a number of alternative BFT
algorithms [1, 20, 32] have been proposed.
Query/Update (Q/U) [1] is a BFT protocol that requires the use of
replicas to tolerate up to

faults, which is more than that is required for PBFT [13, 14].

Clients broadcast the cached histories and their requests to the server replicas and all the
replicas optimistically execute the requests without inter-replica communication. With
Q/U, the performance of the system can be significantly improved in the fault-free
situation since the requests can be accomplished within a single round of communication
12

between the client and server replicas. On the other hand, if the client gets conflicting
results, it will inform the replicas and drive them back to a consistent state. Then the
request will be re-executed again. With more service replicas, Q/U can process the
requests with fewer message exchanges during normal operations. However, it does not
work well in the presence of concurrent update requests.
Hybrid Quorum (HQ) [20] combines both the quorum and agreement approaches.
The same as PBFT, it only requires

different replicas. In contention free cases,

replicas choose the ordering in the first round and process requests in the second round
based on the quorum from

replicas. If any conflicts are detected, HQ relies on

the Byzantine agreement to order and execute the requests. Compared with Q/U, HQ
requires fewer replicas, but needs more rounds during normal execution. However, both
Q/U and HQ cannot batch concurrent requests and have high latency when conflict
happens as pointed out in [50].
Zyzzyva [32] is a speculative Byzantine Fault Tolerance protocol. Unlike other
BFT algorithms, such as [13, 14, 16], it does not require replicas to reach the agreement
before processing the requests. Zyzzyva protocol executes and responds to the clients
immediately with the speculative results. If all replicas produce the same results, clients
will conclude the requests and accept the results. Otherwise, the correct replicas might be
temporarily inconsistent and reply with different answers. Nonetheless, all correct
replicas, with the help of clients, will reach final agreement, and the replies will
guarantee to be committed eventually. Although Zyzzyva significantly improves the
performance during normal fault-free operations, it demands a more complicated
recovery scheme.
13

Furthermore, in all three algorithms (Q/U, HQ, and Zyzzyva [1, 20, 32]), the
replicas need the help from the clients to achieve agreements. We are concerned about
this approach because if the client is faulty, it may endanger the integrity of the replicated
service.

3.2

Related Work of BFT for Nondeterministic Applications

Replica nondeterminism has been studied extensively under the benign fault
model [4, 6, 5, 39, 40, 41, 44, 46, 48, 56, 67]. However, there is no systematic
classification of common types of replica nondeterminism, and even less so on the
unified handling of such nondeterminism. [5, 46, 48] did provide a classification of some
types of replica nondeterminism. However, they largely fall within the types of
wrappable nondeterminism and verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism, with the
exception of nondeterminism caused by asynchronous interrupts, which we do not
address in this dissertation.
The replica nondeterminism caused by multithreading has been studied separately
from other types of nondeterminism, again, under the benign fault mode only, in [4, 6, 39,
40, 41, 44, 51]. These studies provided valuable insight on how to approach the problem
of ensuring consistent replication of multithreaded applications.
It is realized that what matters in achieving replica consistency is to control the
ordering of different threads on access of the same shared data. The mechanisms to
record and to replay such ordering have been developed. So do those for checkpointing
14

and restoring the state of multithreaded applications (for example, [31]). Even though
these mechanisms alone are not sufficient to achieve Byzantine fault tolerance for
multithreaded applications, they can be adapted and used towards this goal. In this
dissertation, we show when to record and (partially) verify the ordering, how to
propagate the ordering, and how to provision for problems encountered when replaying
the ordering, all using the Byzantine fault model.
As mentioned previously, the mechanisms developed in other research work
regarding replica nondeterminism for Byzantine fault tolerance are limited to control a
small subset of common replica nondeterminism, which we refer to as wrappable and
verifiable pre-determinable replica nondeterminism [13, 14, 15, 16]. In BASE [16], it was
recognized that a BFT system can be made more robust (to minimize deterministic
software errors) by adopting a common abstract specification for the service to be
replicated. A conformance wrapper for each distinct implementation is then developed to
ensure that it behaves according to the common specification. Furthermore, an
abstraction function and one of its inverses are needed to map between the concrete state
of each implementation and the common abstract state.
In [14], Castro and Liskov provided a brief guideline on how to deal with the type
of nondeterminism that requires collective determination of the nondeterministic values.
The guideline is very important and useful, as we have followed in this dissertation
research. However, the guideline is applicable to only a subset of the problems we have
addressed. The problem of having to deal with non-verifiable nondeterminism is unique
to the Byzantine fault model.

15

3.3

Related Work of Proactive Recovery

Ensuring Byzantine fault tolerance for long-running systems is an extremely
challenging task. The pioneering work in the context of Byzantine fault tolerance is
carried out by Castro and Liskov [13, 15, 52]. Our work is inspired by their work.
However, the proactive recovery scheme in [13, 15] has a number of issues as we
mentioned briefly in introduction.
First, it assumes that a simple reboot (i.e., power cycle of the computing node)
can be the basis for repairing a compromised node, which might not be the case because
some attacks might cause hardware damages, as pointed out in [52].
Second, even if a compromised node can be repaired by a reboot, it is often a
prolonged process (typically over 30s for modern operating systems). During the
rebooting step, the BFT service might not be available to its clients (e.g., if the rebooting
node happens to be a non-faulty replica needed for the replicas to reach a Byzantine
agreement).
Third, there lacks coordination among replicas to ensure that no more than a small
portion of the replicas (i.e., no more than
tolerate up to

replicas in a system of

replicas to

faults) are undergoing proactive recovery at any given time, otherwise,

the service may be unavailable for extended period of time. The static watchdog timeout
used in [13, 15] also contributes to the problem because it cannot automatically adapt to
various system loads, which means that the timeout value must be set to a conservative
value based on the worst-case scenario. The staggered proactive recovery scheme in [13,
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15] is not sufficient to prevent this problem from happening if the timeout value is set too
short.
Recognizing these issues, a number of researchers have proposed various methods
to enhance the original proactive recovery scheme.
The issue of uncoordinated proactive recovery due to system asynchrony has been
studied by Sousa et al. [53, 54]. They resort to the use of a synchronous sub-system to
ensure the timeliness of each round of proactive recovery. In particular, the proactive
recovery period is determined a priori based on the worst case execution time so that
even under heavy load, there will be no more than

replicas going through proactive

recovery. The impact of proactive recovery schemes on the system availability has also
been studied by Sousa et al. [55] and by Reiser and Kapitza [48].
In the former scheme, extra replicas are introduced to the system and they actively
participate message ordering and execution so that the system is always available when
some replicas are undergoing proactive recovery. However, the recovering replicas are
regarded as failed, and therefore, higher degree of replication is needed to tolerate the
same number of Byzantine faults and all the replicas would have to participate the
Byzantine agreement process. In the latter scheme [48], a new replica is launched in a
different virtual machine by the hypervisor on the same node when an existing replica is
to be rebooted for proactive recovery so that the availability reduction is minimized.
However, if an attack has caused physical damage on the node that hosts the replica to be
recovered, or it has compromised the hypervisor of the node [58], the new replica
launched in the same node in the scheme [48] is likely to malfunction.
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Proactive recovery for intrusion tolerance has been studied in [2, 38] with the
emphasis of confidentiality protection using proactive threshold cryptography [11].
Reboot is also used as the basis to recover compromised replicas, which suggests such
schemes may also suffer from similar problems as those in [13, 14]. The idea of moving
expensive operations off the critical execution path is a well-known system design
strategy, and it has been exploited in other fault-tolerant systems, such as [37, 45, 48].

3.4

Related Work of Concurrent Speculative BFT

The current approach to enable concurrent execution in BFT systems is by
exploiting application semantics. In PBFT [13, 14], it is noted that read-only requests can
be delivered without the need of total ordering.
In [28], Kotla and Dahlin proposed to exploit application semantics for higher
throughput by parallelizing the execution of independent requests. They outlined a
method to track the dependency among the requests using application specific rules. In
[19], Distler and Kapitza further extended Kotla and Dahlin’s work by introducing a
scheme to execute a request on only a selected subset of replicas. This scheme assumes
that the state variables accessed by each request are known, and that the state object
distribution and object access are uniform.
In prior work [17, 60], we proposed to rely on deeper application semantics to not
only enable more requests (such as those that are commutative) to be executed
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concurrently, but also minimize the number of Byzantine agreement steps used in an
application (particularly for session-oriented applications).
This research takes a drastically different approach from those mentioned above.
Rather than resorting to the application semantics, which may be expensive to acquire
accurately and hard to reuse, we rely on the use of software transactional memory to
dynamically capture the dependency of concurrent operations automatically. This
approach is inspired by the work of Brito, Fetzer, and Felber [33], where a similar idea
was used to ensure multithreaded execution for actively-replicated event stream
processing systems. Our work applies the idea in a different context (i.e., Byzantine fault
tolerance instead of crash fault tolerance) and furthermore, we carry out detailed
experiments and analysis on the level of concurrency that can be achieved under various
conditions.
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CHAPTER IV
CONTROLLING REPLICA NONDETERMINISM FOR BFT

State-machine based Byzantine fault tolerant replication requires the replicas to
operate deterministically, i.e., given the same request issued by a client, all replicas
should produce the same reply provided that the replicas are in the same state prior to
processing the request. However, all practical applications contain some degrees of
nondeterminisms. When such applications are replicated to achieve fault tolerance, the
nondeterministic operations must be controlled to reach strong replica consistency.
Otherwise, an adversary may be exploiting the potential inconsistency to compromise the
integrity of the replicated services.
In this chapter, we introduce our classification of common types of replica
nondeterminism and present the system models and mechanisms for controlling these
types of replica nondeterminism for distributed Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) systems.
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4.1

Classification of Replica Nondeterminism

To better understand and handle nondeterminism in distributed systems, we
classify the replica nondeterminisms based on different properties.
First, we introduce a special type of nondeterminism termed as wrappable
nondeterminism.


Wrappable nondeterminism. A type of nondeterminism whose effects can be
mapped into some pre-specified abstract operations and states which are
deterministic.

Wrappable nondeterminism can be easily controlled by using an infrastructureprovided or application-provided wrapper function, without explicit runtime inter-replica
coordination. For example, replica-specific identifiers, such as hostnames, process ids,
and file descriptors, can be determined group-wise before the application is started.
Another situation is when all replicas are implemented according to the same abstract
specification, in which case, a wrapper function can be used to translate between the local
state and the group-wise abstract state, as described in [16].
In this dissertation, we do not provide further discussion on the wrappable
nondeterminism since it can be dealt with by a deterministic wrapper function without
inter-replica coordination, and also because it has been thoroughly studied in [16].
Besides wrappable nondeterminism, we distinguish the rest of replica
nondeterminisms based on two properties, determinable or verifiable.
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Determinable is a property of nondeterminism based on the time when a particular
operation will know the nondeterministic values. Using this as the criterion, we have predeterminable nondeterminism and post-determinable nondeterminism:


Pre-determinable nondeterminism. A type of replica nondeterminism whose
values can be known prior to the execution of a request and it requires interreplica coordination to ensure replica consistency.



Post-determinable nondeterminism. A type of replica nondeterminism whose
values can only be recorded after the request is submitted for execution and
the nondeterministic values won’t be complete until the end of the execution.
It also requires inter-replica coordination to ensure replica consistency.

Nondeterminism verifiability is another criterion for classification. It is on
whether a replica can verify the nondeterministic values proposed (or recorded) by
another replica. According to this criterion, the nondeterminism can be divided into two
different

categories

termed

as

verifiable

nondeterminism

and

non-verifiable

nondeterminism:


Verifiable nondeterminism. A type of replica nondeterminism whose values
can be verified by other replicas.



Non-verifiable nondeterminism. A type of replica nondeterminism whose
values cannot be completely verified by other replicas. Note that a replica
might be able to partially verify some nondeterministic values proposed by
another replica. This would help reduce the impact of a faulty replica.
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Figure 2 Classification of Nondeterminism
By using both criteria, as shown in Figure 2, we have four types of replica
nondeterminisms of our interest:


Verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism (VPRE). In the past, clockrelated operations have been treated as this type of operations. However,
strictly speaking, it is not possible for a replica to verify deterministically the
proposal sent by another replica for the current clock value without imposing
stronger restriction on the synchrony of the distributed system (e.g., bounds on
message propagation, request execution, and the clock drifts).



Non-verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism (NPRE). Online gaming
applications, such as Blackjack and Texas Hold'em, exhibit this type of
nondeterminism. The integrity of services provided by such applications
depends on the use of good secure random number generators. For the best
security, it is essential to make one's choice of a random number unpredictable,
let alone verifiable by other replicas.
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Verifiable post-determinable nondeterminism (VPOST). We have yet to
identify a commonly used application that exhibits this type of
nondeterminism. We include this type for completeness.



Non-verifiable post-determinable nondeterminism (NPOST). In general, all
multithreaded applications exhibit this type of nondeterminism. For such
applications, it is virtually impossible to determine which thread ordering
should be used prior to the execution of a request without losing concurrency.

All four types of nondeterminisms have to be carefully controlled to guarantee
system consistence. We will introduce our mechanisms to handle each of them later in
this chapter.

4.2

System Model

The system model we considered is a client-server based application in an
asynchronous network. Certain synchrony is necessary, similar to [13, 14], to achieve
liveness which means the upper bound of the message transmission and processing delay
has been asymptotic limited. We dynamically set this bound explored in the BFT
algorithm as every time a view change occurs the timeout for the next view change is
doubled.
Most frequently, both the client and the server, we believe, should be under
normal operations. However, in very little cases, both of them could fall into Byzantine
faults. We replicate the application server on
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different nodes to tolerant up to

failures and each of replicas is modeled as a state machine. All servers are required to
run or rendered to run deterministically even with some level of nondeterminisms, as we
clarified before. To handle nondeterminisms, two critical issues to be resolved in the
state-machine replicated system: the total ordering of requests and the required
nondeterministic values. We are using BFT framework developed in [13, 14] to achieve
the total ordering of the requests.
In the next section, we describe how we integrate our mechanisms into the BFT
algorithm to control replica nondeterminisms so that all correct replicas will reach strong
consistence on both the message ordering and the nondeterministic values.

4.3

Controlling Nondeterminism

Now, we introduce our mechanisms to handle common types of nondeterminisms.

4.3.1

Controlling VPRE Nondeterminism

If an operation contains Verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism (VPRE), the
primary replica proposes the nondeterministic values in the ndet parameter. Then both the
nondeterminism type and obtained value are multicast in the PRE-PREPARE message to
backups.
A replica verifies two critical parts when it receives a PRE-PREPARE message,
the type and the values of nondeterminism. The nondeterminism type in clients’ request
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should be consistent with the one reported by the primary, and the nondeterministic
values proposed by the primary is consistent with the replicas’. If both of validation
process success, the backup replica accepts the PRE-PREPARE message from primary
with ordering information and the nondeterministic values, and multicasts a PREPARE
message to all other replicas. Otherwise, the replica suspects the primary and initializes a
view change. From now on, the rest of the algorithm works the same as the original BFT
algorithm, with the digest of the nondeterministic values included in both the PREPARE
and the COMMIT messages. Figure 3 illustrats the details on how to control VPRE
nondeterminism.
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Figure 3 Normal Operation of the Modified BFT Algorithm for VPRE
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4.3.2

Controlling NPRE Nondeterminism

If the nondeterminism for the operation at the primary is of type non-verifiable
pre-determinable nondeterminism (NPRE), an extra phase, pre-prepare-update phase, is
added to handle the nondeterminism. The idea behind it is to let every replica contributes
its share of nondeterministic values which can prevent potential damage from any faulty
replicas injecting the predicable value as nondeterminism.
When the primary gets the request with the type of NPRE nondeterminism, it
proposes its share of nondeterministic values and multicasts the PRE-PREPARE message
which includes both the type and the values of the nondeterminism to all backup replicas.
On receiving the PRE-PREPARE message, on top of original BFT, a backup
replica only verifies the type of nondeterminism supplied by the primary is the same as
the one included in the original request from clients. If the verification is successful, the
backup replica builds a PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE message including its own share of
NPRE nondeterministic values, and sends the PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE message back
to the primary. Also the backup retrieves the nondeterministic values from primary and
save it for later usage.
The primary expects

PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE messages from different

replicas for a single request. These

PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE messages contain

different sets of contributions for NPRE nondeterministic values. Including the one from
primary,

set of contributions with proposer’s digital signature protection will be

sent from primary to backup replicas in a PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE message. When a
replica gets the valid PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE message from the primary, it will
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replace the old nondeterministic value with the new one it calculated based on all
contributions. From now on, the BFT algorithm operates as the traditional way, except
that both the PREPARE and COMMIT messages, the same as VPRE, also carry the
digest of the nondeterministic values, and the

sets of nondeterministic values are

delivered to the application layer as parameters of the execution. The normal operation of
the modified BFT algorithm for NPRE nondeterminism is illustrated in Figure 4.
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4.3.3

Controlling VPOST Nondeterminism

In section 4.3.3 and section 4.3.4, we introduce the mechanisms to deal with
POST-determinable nondeterminisms. To handle either verifiable post-determinable
nondeterminism

(VPOST)

or

non-Verifiable

post-determinable

nondeterminism

(NPOST), the post-commit phase is necessary. Different from the pre-prepare-update
phase for controlling NPRE, the post-commit phase involves the whole life-cycle of the
Byzantine fault tolerance algorithm for correct replicas to reach an agreement on the
nondeterministic values, which means that three rounds of control message exchanges are
required similar to the way to determine the total ordering of requests under normal
operation.
For VPOST, the primary, in the first round of Byzantine Agreement, includes
only the nondeterminism type along with the ordering information in the PRE-PREPARE
message without any nondeterministic values. The PRE-PREPARE message is multicast
to all backup replicas to start the BFT algorithm. On receiving the PRE-PREPARE
message, a backup replica checks the nondeterminism type after verification of the
client’s request and the ordering information. If the validation succeeds, the process will
proceeds as usual to the prepare and the commit phases.
When an agreement is reached on the total ordering and nondeterminism type, the
request message is delivered for execution at primary. As Post-determinable
nondeterminism, a recorded nondeterministic value is expected as well as reply message.
Once the primary returns from the execution, it sends the reply back to the client and
builds a postnd log including nondeterministic values and the digest of the reply. This
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postnd log will be send to backup replicas to verify whether the primary has actually
generated the reply with the corresponding nondeterministic values. This starts the postcommit phase.
In the post-commit phase, the focus will be the nondeterministic values as well as
the reply message, since we are not worrying about ordering information any more. With
another round of BFT algorithm, all correct backup replicas should agree on the same set
of nondeterministic values from primary and the values will be used in their own
execution. Then the backup replicas produce a reply and compare the digest with the one
from primary. If either second Byzantine Agreement cannot be reached or message digest
mismatch, the primary will be suspected. However, the request will still be delivered for
execution if the agreement reached on the nondeterministic values and the replica will
send the reply back to client regardless of digest comparison result. This is because,
replicas believe, the client will get the expected replies if all correct replicas execute the
request with the same nondeterministic values, even different then the primary. Figure 5
shows the details about the normal operation of the modified BFT algorithm we used to
handle VPOST.
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4.3.4

Controlling NPOST Nondeterminism

To handle the non-verifiable post-determinable nondeterminism (NPOST), we use
the same strategy as described in the previous subsection for controlling VPOST until a
backup replica is ready to deliver the request to the application layer, as shown in Figure
6.
In contrast to VPOST, we have one more concern here. A faulty primary may
disseminate some unexpected nondeterministic values to try to either confuse the backup
replicas, or block them from providing useful services to the clients. For example, if the
nondeterministic values are about thread interleaving, a faulty primary might provide the
information in such a way to lead the backup replicas to deadlock or racing condition
which might make the system crash. This is because the replicas, in general, cannot
completely verify the correctness of the nondeterministic values until it actually executes
the request. To prevent the system from crashing, we lunch a monitoring thread, as
governance, separately with the main execution thread. And this monitoring thread can
recover the replica when it runs into crash failures.
On the other hand, if the main thread can successfully complete the execution,
then the backup replicas performs the same reply verification procedure as that described
in the previous subsection.
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4.4

View Change

A faulty primary might prevent a non-faulty replica from reaching a Byzantine
agreement on either the ordering information and/or the associated nondeterministic
values. When the backup replicas suspect the primary by any reason, they will start a
view change to select a new primary. It might take more than one round of view changes
for the whole process to select a new non-faulty primary and reach the Byzantine
agreement in the new view. Moreover, during the view change, it is very important to
carry over the adequate information from one view to another so that replicas could reach
agreement on the same ordering information and nondeterministic values in different
views.
The view change mechanism involves three control messages, consisting of
VIEW-CHANGE, VIEW-CHANGE-ACK, and NEW-VIEW. A non-faulty replica
initializes the view change if one of the following cases is true: (1) its view change timer
expires; (2) it suspects either the ordering information or the nondeterministic values (for
verifiable nondeterminism); (3) backups generate a different reply with primary (for post
nondeterminism); (4) it receives

view change requests from other replicas. The

basic view change flow we are using is the same as view change mechanism from
original BFT algorithm. Besides we add the sets of information about states of post-preprepared and post-prepared in previous views (for Byzantine agreement on postdeterminable nondeterminism).
To initialize view change, a replica updates all associated data in the log and then,
based on records in its log, constructs a VIEW-CHANGE message. Upon multicasting
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the VIEW-CHANGE messages, the replica cleans the log files since they are no longer
useful. A replica accepts the VIEW-CHANGE message and replies a VIEW-CHANGEACK to the new primary of next view if the VIEW-CHANGE has all the information for
current or an earlier view.
If the new primary in next view collects a VIEW-CHANGE message and
corresponding VIEW-CHANGE-ACK messages, it stores them as an entry with each
entry is for a different replica. When the new primary has entries for

replicas, it

builds a NEW-VIEW message by using the data in the entries and broadcasts it to all
other replicas. The NEW-VIEW message contains the start state of the new view as
checkpoint, all requests with the sequence number start from the checkpoint to the most
recent, and the associated nondeterministic values. All the information in NEW-VIEW is
required to reach the agreement across different views. The new primary chooses the
checkpoint from the information in the entries that the sequence number greater or equal
to its own low water marker with support from at least

non-faulty replicas. If any

requests, nondeterministic values, or checkpoints are missing from local, the new primary
may fetch the state from other replicas. Start from the checkpoint, all requests later will
once again go through the Byzantine agreement determination procedure as the way we
introduced in section 4.3. For post-determinable nondeterminism, as an exception, if only
ordering information is built in previous views without post-nondeterministic values, the
NULL value will be included in NEW-VIEW message and the new primary will be
responsible to propose new values to be used during the requests re-execution, which also
requires the post commit phase to reach agreement.
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When a backup replica, in the new view, receives a NEW-VIEW message, it
validates the view change by comparing the proof in NEW-VIEW message with its own
collection of VIEW-CHANGE messages. If a VIEW-CHANGE message missing locally,
the replica requires a proof of correctness from new primary including the original
VIEW-CHANGE message and

acknowledgements associated. Then, after validation

is confirmed, the replica rebuilds a NEW-VIEW message with local information and
compares it with the one received from new primary. If the verification passes, the
normal operation resumes, otherwise, another view change is initialized immediately
until successful. Figure 7 shows the details of view change.
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VIEW-CHANGE
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VIEW-CHANGE-ACK
NEW-VIEW
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Primary (1)

Replica (2)

Figure 7 View Change
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Replica (3)

4.5

Implementation, Optimization, and Performance Evaluation

The implementation of mechanisms described in previous sections has been done
in C++ and integrated into the BFT framework [13, 14, 15, 16]. A comprehensive
experimental study has been carried out on the platform consists of 14 HP blade servers
with each of them has two Quad-Core Intel Xeon 2GHz CPUs and 5GB memories. All
blade servers are running Ubuntu Server 9 and are connected by Cisco Catalyst Blade
3020 Gigabit Ethernet Switch.
In performance evaluation, we focus on the overhead for providing controls on
nondeterminisms in the BFT layer. The application layer work, such as cost associated
with recording and verifying nondeterministic values, is not studied.
Furthermore, in practical applications, a request may involve more than one type
of nondeterminism. Thus, we considered the possibility of composite types of
nondeterminisms. Because we have yet identified any practical applications with VPOST,
this type is omitted. The only types of nondeterminisms will be included in basic
performance evaluations are listed as following.


VPRE: Single type with verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism



NPRE: Single type with non-verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism



NPOST: Single type with non-verifiable post-determinable nondeterminism



VNPRE: Composite type with both verifiable pre-determinable
nondeterminism and non-verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism



VPRE-NPOST: Composite type with both verifiable pre-determinable
nondeterminism and non-verifiable post determinable nondeterminism
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NPRE-NPOST: Composite type with both non-verifiable pre-determinable
nondeterminism and non-verifiable post-determinable nondeterminism



VNPRE-NPOST: Composite type with verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism, non-verifiable pre-determinable nondeterminism, and nonverifiable post-determinable nondeterminism.

In following sections, we first present, before performance evaluation, several
optimizations we did to the mechanisms described previously. Then in basic performance
evaluation, we use a single client with respect to all 7 types of nondeterminism listed
above and various sizes of nondeterministic data (for clarity, we refer nondeterministic
data as the set of nondeterministic values associated with each type of nondeterminism).
Next, stress test, we present experiment results under various numbers of concurrent
clients. In the final part, we report the impact of our mechanisms on the end-to-end
latency during view changes.

4.5.1

Optimizations

All the results shown in following sections are obtained after optimization works,
with which, the performance is significantly improved.
We optimized our mechanisms to handle NPRE nondeterminism. In pre-prepareupdate phase, the primary will collect contributions of nondeterministic data from at least
replicas and re-calculate a new one based on them. In PRE-PREPARE-UPDATE
message from primary to replicas, the primary provides the proof of correctness including
the collection of nondeterministic data used in re-calculation. Instead of multicasting the
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whole nondeterministic data set, the primary disseminates the collection of digests, which
will sharply reduce the message size especially when the data is large. Then the backup
replicas could verify the digests from primary with its local copies. If a replica recognizes
one or more missing proposed nondeterministic data locally, the retransmissions are
required.
Another optimization we introduced is in the post-commit phase, which is used to
handle NPOST nondeterminism. When we have multiple requests to process, we
piggybacked the postn log, instead of a totally separate Byzantine agreement phase, with
the PRE-PREPARE message of next request. In this way, we combine the Byzantine
agreement for nondeterminism data of current request with the total ordering information
of next request, which reduces the number of control message exchanges needed. Even
though, the end-to-end latency for a particular request slightly increases, as a result, the
overall throughput is significantly improved. If there is only a single request, as normal
operation when the number of client is one, the post-commit phase still has to be done
separately.

4.5.2

Basic Performance Evaluation

Error! Reference source not found. and Figure 9 show the summary of the endto-end latency and throughput measurements for a client-server application under normal
operation for different types of replica nondeterminism. For each iteration, a client issues
a 1KB request to the server replicas and waits for the reply which will also be 1KB fixed
size. When the client gets the valid reply, it sends out another request with no waiting
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time between. For each run, we measure the total elapsed time for 100,000 consecutive
iterations at client side, and calculate the average end-to-end latency and throughput.
The handling of different types of nondeterminism, except for VPRE, involves
extra phases of message exchanges to reach agreements on both the ordering information
and the nondeterministic data. As such, as shown in Error! Reference source not found.
and Figure 9, the end-to-end latency is noticeably larger and the throughput is smaller,
than that of VPRE. Furthermore, with larger size of nondeterministic data, the
performance difference is more significant.

Figure 8 End-to-End Latency for Different Types of Nondeterminism under Normal
Operations
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Figure 9: Average Throughput for Different Types of Nondeterminism under Normal
Operations
With a closer look, one may notice a surprising scenario. There is a crossover for
NPRE and NPOST in end-to-end latency. When the nondeterministic data size is small,
the end-to-end latency of NPRE is smaller compared with NPOST. However, the latency
for requests with NPRE grows rapidly when the nondeterministic data size increasing and
becomes higher than that for the requests with NPOST eventually. This is because the
pre-prepare-update phase, even with the optimization above, still involves at least two
large messages while the post-commit phase has only one. For NPOST, it has a full
Byzantine agreement loop including two more rounds of message exchanges than for
NPRE, and this leads to a relatively large end-to-end latency when the nondeterministic
data is small. However, following by increasing the size of nondeterminism data, the
transmission delay for messages that contain large size of data takes dominate, it results
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in much faster grow of end-to-end latency for NPRE, and eventually surpasses that for
NPOST. The crossover for the throughput results shown in Figure 9 is due to the same
reason.

4.5.3

Stress Tests

So far we did the experiments for normal operation with single client. In this
section, as summarized in Figure 10 and Figure 11, we present the performance reports
on stress tests with various numbers of concurrent requests from different clients. We use
multiple clients issue the requests to the replicated server at the same time. Each of
clients sends 100,000 requests consecutively, where the size of the nondeterministic data
is kept at 256 Bytes.
With multiple concurrent requests, batching mechanism is enabled, which
improves the overall throughput of the system. However, with larger number of clients,
the waiting time increases. For a particular request, the latency becomes larger, as shown
in Figure 10 and Figure 11.
Interestingly, there are other crossovers contained in the multi-clients
performance diagram which also happens between NPRE and NPOST nondeterminisms.
When the number of concurrent clients is less than 7, the type of NPRE is faster than
NPOST. However, starting with 8 clients, the latency of NPOST becomes smaller. The
reason for this phenomenon is because of the optimization we introduced previously. For
NPOST nondeterminism, when there are sufficient number of concurrent clients, virtually
all post-commit phase are combined with following requests. So it improves the
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throughput for requests with NPOST nondeterminism when the number of clients
increasing.

Figure 10 End-to-end Latency for Multiple Clients with Different Types of Replica
Nondeterminism under Normal Operation
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Figure 11 Throughput for Requests with Different Types of Replica Nondeterminism
under Normal Operation

4.5.4

Impact on End-to-End Latency during View Changes

Until now, both basic performance and stress tests focus on the normal operations.
In this section, we experience the impact of our mechanisms on the performance of view
changes. In the experiment, a single client issues the requests to the replicated service.
And some requests are instrumented so that they will crash the primary which will lead to
a view change. We set the view change timer as 5-second, message retransmission timer
as 150-millisecond and choose to use client side end-to-end latency, including the roundtrip time of communication, the time used to detect the primary failure, and the view
change latency, as the metric. Furthermore, a view change always succeeds and no
message is lost during the view change.
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Table 1 End-to-end Latency during View Changes
ND Data Size
ND Data Type
BFT with no ND

End-to-End Latency (seconds)
128 Bytes

256 Bytes

512 Bytes

1024 Bytes

2048 Bytes

4096 Bytes

5.303915

VPRE

5.303713

5.303834

5.304212

5.304548

5.30449

5.304659

NPRE

5.304126

5.304294

5.304016

5.303665

5.30423

5.304159

NPOST

5.304225

5.304572

5.304388

5.304486

5.304382

5.304593

The view change experimental results are summarized in
Table 1. As can be seen, the end-to-end latency, for various scenarios, remains
virtually equal, including the one without nondeterminism. This is what we expected
since the mechanisms to handle different types of nondeterminism have very minimum
impact on the view change. According to section 4.4, in modified view change
mechanism, only the digest of nondeterministic data is piggybacked in the VIEWCHANGE and NEW-VIEW messages. Furthermore, in our experiments, we assume there
is no message lost during transactions. Therefore, from the performance point of view, it
has virtually no negative effect.

4.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented our mechanisms for handling common types of
nondeterminism in a systematic and efficient manner based on the classification we
introduced. The implementation of these mechanisms is carried out by extending the
well-known BFT framework developed by Castro, Rodrigues, and Liskov [13, 16], which
had very limited support for replica nondeterminism. Furthermore, we conducted
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extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our framework. And we show that
our mechanisms only incur moderate runtime overhead.
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CHAPTER V
PROACTIVE RECOVERY

State-machine based Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) algorithms, including those
designed to control replica nondeterminism described in the previous chapter, assume the
availability of

replicas to tolerate up to

faulty replicas. However, over the

lifetime of a system, the number of faulty replicas may eventually exceed

in the

presence of persistent adversaries. To ensure the reliability and the availability over
extended period of time (typically 24x7 and all year long), proactive recovery [48, 53, 54,
55], where replicas are periodically restarted and repaired before they are detected to be
faulty, becomes essential.
In this chapter, we present our proactive recovery scheme for BFT. Compared
with the proactive recovery scheme proposed by Castro and Liskov [13, 15], the primary
beneﬁt of our scheme is a reduced vulnerability window under normal operation. This is
achieved by two means. First, the time-consuming reboot step is removed from the
critical path of proactive recovery. Second, the response time and the service migration
latency are continuously proﬁled and an optimal service migration interval is dynamically
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determined during runtime based on the observed system load and the user-speciﬁed
availability requirement.

5.1

System Model

Our proactive recovery scheme partially relies on the synchrony of the system,
i.e., the round of proactive recovery should be completed within a bounded time.
However, all Byzantine agreement needed in the proactive recovery is guaranteed to be
safe without any synchrony assumption.
Our service migration-based proactive recovery scheme includes three main
components:

1. A pool of nodes for active server replicas. To tolerate up to
replicas,

Byzantine faulty

service replicas are needed in the active pool and they do all

the operations as we discussed in the previous chapter.
2. A pool of standby nodes. The size of standby pool should be large enough
(

) to repair damaged nodes while enabling frequent service migration for

proactive recovery.
3. A trusted configuration manager (similar to what has been described in [52]).
This trusted configuration manager is to manage the pool of standby nodes,
and to assist service migration. i.e., it is frequently probing and monitoring the
health of each standby node, and repairing any faulty nodes detected.
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Three main components are separated to different subnets which are connected by
an advanced managed switch (i.e., Cisco Catalyst 6500) for faults isolation. Each node,
either in active pool or standby pool, has three network interfaces NIC1, NIC2, and
NIC3. We use NIC1 for connection to external network, NIC2 to connect between active
and standby pools, and NIC3 for connection to the configuration manager. Although each
node installs three network interfaces, only the ones in active pool have all three enabled.
In standby pool, we disable NIC1 to make the nodes only accessible internally. Trusted
configuration manager can dynamically control NIC1 and NIC2 of any node through
NIC3, e.g., it can disable NIC1 on a node to remove it from active pool and switch NIC2
of the same node to add it in standby pool.
All server replicas may be subject to malicious faults in both active and standby
pools. However, the majority attacks, we assume, are imposed from external networks.
So the successful attacks on the standby nodes, which are isolated from external
environment, should be much less likely than those on the nodes in the active pool.
Similar to [54, 55], we assume only fail-stop model failures are on the trusted
configuration manager and, to ensure high availability, the trusted configuration manager
is replicated using the Paxos algorithm [35]. Other assumptions regarding the system still
hold as we mentioned in the previous chapter.
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5.2

Proactive Service Migration Mechanisms

The proactive service migration mechanisms ensure long term reliability and
availability. The detailed objectives including:


Ensure a consistent membership view for available standby nodes on each
active replica;

5.2.1



Determine the time and the method to start a migration;



Select the source and the target nodes for migration;



Transfer the correct state to the new active replicas;



Notify the clients with the new membership after each proactive recovery.

Standby Nodes Registration

The nodes in the standby pool are controlled by the trusted configuration
manager. Probing and sanitization procedures are applied on standby nodes periodically
to ensure that they are not compromised. To ensure all the correct active replicas have the
consistent membership of the available standby nodes, a refreshed standby node needs to
notify all active replicas when the sanitization procedure are finished successfully.
Otherwise, if the trusted configuration manager cannot repair the faulty nodes, a system
administrator will be called to manually fix the problem.
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Pool of Standby Nodes
Standby Node (0)

Pool of Active Server Replicas
Primary (0)

Replica (1)

Replica (2)

Replica (3)

Sanitization
Procedure

JOIN-REQUEST

pre-prepare for JOIN-REQUEST with timestamp

BFT Algorithm for JOIN-REQUEST
Update Standby
Nodes Membership

JOIN-APPROVED

Figure 12 Standby Nodes Registration Protocol
The registration protocol is illustrated in Figure 12. A node in standby pool
multicasts the JOIN-REQUEST, including a counter maintained by the secure
coprocessor, to all active service replicas. An active replica will accept the JOINREQUEST if the request is the one with highest counter from the same standby node.
When the primary gets the valid JOIN-REQUEST, it will assign a timestamp to the
request as the join time and initialize a Byzantine agreement process. This process is
important, so that all active nodes have the consistent membership view of the standby
nodes. The significance of the join time will be elaborated later. When the JOINREQUEST has been committed, the correct active replicas will update its own standby
nodes membership and send the JOIN-APPROVED reply back. The registration process
completes if the requesting standby node gets
messages from different active replicas.
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matched JOIN-APPROVED

A standby node might have gone through multiple rounds of proactive
sanitization before it is selected to enter active pool and run an active replica. Every time
the repairing procedure completes, a new registration is triggered to reconfirm the
membership. The active replicas subsequently update the join time of the standby node if
the registration process completes successfully.
Although standby nodes are much less likely to be compromised, it is still
possible. When the configuration manager deems a registered standby node as faulty, an
on-demand service repair will be initialized and the standby node is deregistered from the
active replicas by sending a LEAVE-REQUEST. The LEAVE-REQUEST is handled in a
similar way as that for JOIN-REQUEST.

5.2.2

Proactive Recovery

Proactive recovery will be triggered if either one of the two scenarios becomes
true:


The software-based recovery timer expires, or



An on-demand service recovery is invoked by the trusted configuration
manager.

A proactive recovery timer is started at the beginning of the service and is reset at
the end of each round of migration. One of the advantages of our proactive service
migration is that the recovery timer can be adjusted dynamically based on the synchrony
of the system and the workload on the system. This benefit can prevent harmful excessive
concurrent proactive recoveries and a potentially large window of vulnerability.
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The migration timer is initialized when we start the replicated service and it
requires several user specified parameters, including:
— the most important parameter.

1. The target system availability

2. The minimum number of requests

served during a single round of

proactive service migration.

Furthermore, to elaborate our algorithm on how to adjust the proactive recovery
timer, we define some symbols here:

1. The response time to order and execute a request

. Please note,

does not

include the queuing delay for the request being ordered.
2. The latency

to carry out a service migration, i.e., the time it takes to swap

out an active replica and replace it with a clean standby replica.

The timeout value is initialized to
measure the average response time
migration latency

, and during runtime, we continuously

for the most recent

requests and the service

. A notification is sent to the system administrator if either the

response time or the service migration latency exceeds the worst-case values.
Based on the availability, we can calculate the service migration timeout value by
the following equation:

(4.1)

The parameter
dynamically adjusted to

is defined by user. The migration timeout value
, if

is

. So to satisfy both the requirements on
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the minimum number of requests served in each migration period and the target system
availability, the migration timeout

is set as following:

(4.2)

On expiration of the migration timer, a replica chooses a set of
and a set of

standby nodes to initialize the proactive recovery.

active replicas,

active replicas are

selected based on the reverse order of their identifiers. For example, since we have
active replicas, so in the fourth round, we have only one left which is required to
be recovered next round. Then we select other
from

to

. So replicas with id 0,

, …,

active replicas with identifiers
are selected. The set of

standby nodes is selected on the timestamp of the registration, the younger the better. We
choose the ones with the latest timestamp because of the least probability of these nodes
to have been compromised at the time of migration (assuming brute-force attacks by
adversaries).
After making the decisions on the service migration sets, the replica multicasts an
INIT-MIGRATION request to all others. There is a migration number contained in the
initial migration request, which is determined by the number of successful migration
rounds recorded by the replica. A correct replica accepts an INIT-MIGRATION message
if all three conditions are hold:
(1) The INIT-MIGRATION message carries a valid authenticator;
(2) The receiver has not accepted another INIT-MIGRATION message from the
same replica in the same view with the equal or higher migration number;
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(3) Selected set of active replicas and set of standby replicas are consistent with
the sets determined by the receiver according to the same migration set
selection algorithm.
When a replica gets

consistent INIT-MIGRATION from different replicas, it

will construct the MIGRATION-REQUEST message. The most important requirement of
the proactive recovery is to ensure a consistent up-to-date state for service migration,
which can be done by Sync-Point Determination Phase. In the Sync-Point Determination
Phase, the migration requests are totally ordered with respect to normal requests, and the
one with top priority will be processed immediately without queuing. The primary orders
the MIGRATION-REQUEST in the same way as that for a normal request, except that
(1) It does not batch the MIGRATION-REQUEST message with normal requests,
and
(2) It piggybacks the MIGRATION-REQUEST and

INIT-MIGRATION

messages, as proof of validity, with the PRE-PREPARE message. The reason
for ordering the MIGRATION-REQUEST is to ensure a consistent
synchronization point for migration at all replicas.
An illustration of the migration initiation protocol is shown in Figure 13.
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Pool of Standby Nodes
Standby Node (0)

Pool of Active Server Replicas
Primary (0)

Replica (1)

Replica (2)

Replica (3)

Migration
Timer Expires
INIT-MIGRATION

Construct
MIGRATIONREQUEST

Init-Migration
Phase

pre-prepare for MIGRATION-REQUEST

BFT Algorithm for
MIGRATION-REQUEST

Sync-Point
Determination
Phase

State Transfer
Phase
MIGRATION-NOW
(with checkpoint)

Figure 13 Proactive Service Migration Protocol
Each replica starts a view change timer after the MIGRATION-REQUEST
message has been constructed. If it cannot receive the PRE-PREPARE message from
current primary before the timer expiration, a view change will be initiated. The new
primary should resume the proactive service migration.
Again, the MIGRATION-REQUEST message is totally ordered to ensure that all
correct active replicas reach the same synchronization point when performing the service
migration. The only difference with the normal requests ordering is that the replica must
have all

INIT-MIGRATION messages the primary used to construct the
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MIGRATION-REQUEST, and verify the active node set and standby node set match
those in the INIT-MIGRATION messages.
When a correct replicas reach the synchronization point, it takes the checkpoint of
its state, including both the application and the BFT middleware state, and multicasts a
MIGRATE-NOW message to the

standby nodes to be migrated and all replicas of the

configuration manager. The MIGRATE-NOW message contains a set of tuples to
identify the pair of source-node and target-node. The standby node that is designated as
the target node will replace the active node indicated as the source node, once it
completes the proactive recovery procedure.
A replica sends the actual checkpoint, together with all queued request messages
if it is the primary, to the target nodes in separate messages. If a replica is to be
recovered, its NIC1 interface is expected to be disabled and it stops accepting any new
requests. However, this holds for correct replicas only. If the replica is faulty, it might not
do so. This is the reason why the trusted configuration manager must be informed of the
migration by all correct active replicas. When there are

MIGRATE-NOW

notifications, the configuration manager changes the switch configuration to forcefully
disable the NIC1 interface from the switch end and performs other sanitizing operations
on the faulty nodes.
When a standby node collects

matched MIGRATE-NOW requests, it is

promoted to run as an active replica and then applies the checkpoint to its state. From
now on, this node starts to participate in the normal operation and becomes a new valid
active replica.

59

5.2.3

New Membership Notification

A faulty or potential faulty replica can be recovered by our alternative proactive
recovery scheme. However, there is a lag between when a faulty replica has been
migrated and when it has been sanitized by the configuration manager. In the meantime,
the faulty replica still can send messages to the active replicas and the clients. Hence it is
very important to inform the clients with the new membership of the active replicas so
that they will ignore the messages received from the current active pool during the
transition period.
To improve the performance, the NEW-MEMBERSHIP notification is performed
in a lazy manner after the first request of the service migration has been processed.
However, if the primary replica has been selected to be replaced, the notification should
be sent immediately so the clients could send their requests to the new primary instead of
the old one. Furthermore, the notification is sent only from original active replicas, not
the new ones, because the clients do not know them yet.

5.2.4

On-Demand Migration

On-demand migration is invoked when one or more faulty nodes have been
detected by either the trusted configuration manager or by a replica with the solid
evidence. The mechanism is very similar for both the timer based service migration and
the on-demand service migration, except the trigger itself and the faulty nodes selection,
since for on-demand migration, the nodes to be sanitized are already decided. The
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migration process is the same and both should start with the INIT-MIGRATION
message.

5.3

Performance Evaluation

We implemented the proactive service migration mechanisms described in this
chapter and integrated into the Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) framework developed by
Castro, Rodrigues and Liskov [13, 15, 16]. All the related operations are simulated in
software. And furthermore, we didn’t fully implement the trusted configuration manager
since we lack the sophisticated hardware equipment to facilitate the subnet dynamic
control.
The testbed of the experiments consists of a set of Dell SC440 servers with a
Pentium dual-core 2.8GHz CPU and 1GB RAM. They are running SuSE Linux 10.2.
Similar to [13], those are general-purpose servers without hardware coprocessors. All the
components including the configuration manager, the three pools of replicas, and the
clients are located in the same physical local area network connected with a 100 Mbps
switch.
The motivation of the experiments is to evaluate the runtime performance of the
proactive service migration scheme. The micro-benchmarking example included in the
original BFT framework is adapted as the test application. Both the request and the reply
messages are set to 1KB fixed length, and each client generates requests consecutively
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without any think time. We are using a 1ms processing delay by busy loop to simulate
some actual workload before it echoes back the payload to the client.
Due to the potential large state, we employed the following optimization: only
one node sends the full checkpoint to the target node and the others send the digest of the
checkpoint instead. The target node can verify the checkpoint by comparing the digest
generated from the full copy with the ones received from other replicas.
We present two sets of experiments. First, the runtime cost of the service
migration mechanism with a fixed migration timer. Second, characteristics on
dynamically adjusted migration period with various conditions.

5.3.1

Runtime Cost of Service Migration

We present the runtime cost of the service migration schema by measuring the
recovery time on a single node with various service state sizes. In each run, the service
migration interval is kept at 10s. The recovery time is determined by measuring the time
elapsed between the following two events:
(1) The primary sending the PRE-PREPARE message for the MIGRATIONREQUEST, and
(2) The primary receiving a notification from the target standby node indicating
that it has collected and applied the latest stable checkpoint.
We refer to this time interval as the service migration latency. Figure 14
summarizes the service migration latency with respect to various state sizes and the
number of concurrent clients. It is not surprising to see that the cost of migration is
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limited by available bandwidth (100Mbps) since the time to take a local checkpoint and
restore one is negligible in our experiments (memory operation). This is intentional for
two reasons:
(1) The check point taking and restoration cost is very application dependent, and
(2) Such cost is the same regardless of the proactive recovery schemes used.

Figure 14 Service Migration Latency for Different State Sizes
Furthermore, we measure the migration latency as a function of the system load in
terms of the number of concurrent clients. As can be seen in Figure 15, the migration
latency increases more significantly for larger state when the system load is higher. When
there are eight concurrent clients, the migration latency for a state size of 50MB is close
to 10s. This observation suggests that if a fixed watchdog timer is used, the watchdog
timeout must be set to a very conservative worst-case value. If the watchdog timeout is
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too short for the system to go through four rounds of proactive recovery (of
a time), there will be more than

replicas at

replicas going through proactive recoveries

concurrently, which will decrease the system availability, even without any fault.

Figure 15 Service Migration Latency with Respect to the System Load

5.3.2

Dynamic Adjustment of Migration Interval

The objective of this set of experiments is to demonstrate the capability of
dynamic migration interval adjustment. The results present how the migration interval
changes under different system loads due to various concurrent clients and state sizes.
We provide following parameters as user specified:

1. Target system availability
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2. Minimum number of requests served during a round of proactive service
migration
3. Initial value of the service migration interval

Figure 16 shows the results of the dynamic adaptation of migration interval in the
presence of a single client. As expected, when the state size is relatively small, 20MB or
below,

is used because the migration latency is small and the user specified

minimum requests needed to meet. As the state size increases, larger migration latency is
needed to meet the availability requirement. Again, we show that the migration interval
dynamically determined are much smaller than the worst-case value except when the
state size is very large.

Figure 16 Dynamic Adaption of Migration Interval for Different State Size
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Figure 17 shows us the migration interval with various numbers of concurrent
clients. It may be surprising to note that the migration timeout value actually decreases
when the number of concurrent clients increases for state sizes of 5MB and 10MB. This
might appear to be counterintuitive. However, it can be easily explained. This is an
artifact caused by the aggressive batching mechanism in the BFT framework [13] we
used. With batching, the cost of ordering a single request is reduced. Consequently, the
response time per request is reduced, which results in a smaller migration timeout value.
(Recall that

does not include the queuing delay of the request being ordered.)

Another interesting observation is that the migration timeout values determined at
runtime are much smaller than the worst-case value except when the state size is large
and the number of concurrent clients is significant. For many applications, their state size
might gradually increase over time as they process more application requests. A larger
state would mean larger migration latency, as indicated in equation 4.2.
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Figure 17 Corresponding Migration Interval with Respect to the Number of Concurrent
Clients

5.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we introduced a novel proactive recovery scheme based on service
migration for long-running Byzantine fault tolerant systems. We described in detail the
challenges and mechanisms needed for our migration-based proactive recovery to work.
The primary benefit of our migration-based recovery scheme is a smaller vulnerability
window during normal operation. When the system load is light, the migration interval
can be dynamically adapted to a smaller value from the initial conservative value, which
is usually set based on the worst-case scenario, and hence, resulting in a smaller
vulnerability window. Our scheme also shifts the time consuming repairing step out of
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the critical execution path, which also contributes to a less chance to compromise and a
smaller vulnerability window. We demonstrated the benefits of our scheme
experimentally with a working prototype.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCURRENT BFT

In existing Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithms, application requests are
executed one after another according to the established total ordering to ensure strong
replica consistency. This inevitably limits the performance of the system without fully
exploiting the multi-core processors that are pervasively available today. To lift the
limitation, we incorporate the Software Transaction Memory (STM) technique into BFT
systems. By using STM, it is possible to delivery multiple requests for concurrent
execution as long as the commit order is controlled such that the order conforms to the
total ordering of the requests that triggered the transactions, which is referred to as the
ordering rule in this chapter. Furthermore, we can use the multi-version and commit
barrier approaches to enable speculation to further improve the performance by preexecuting the requests and hold the result temporarily until the execution is validated. If,
by any chance, the speculation is wrong, the system will rollback and re-execute the
requests based on the correct order.
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In this chapter, we introduce our concurrent and speculative BFT algorithm that
could bring the performance of BFT system to a new level.

6.1

Conflicts Model

Conflicts management is a very important task during the concurrent execution of
multiple transactions. To better understand it, we introduce the conflicts model in web
applications first with examples. We do not discuss basic read/write or write/write
conflicts in our conflicts model because they can be easily controlled. We only focus on
conflicting operations that can pass the validation test, but may lead to the violation of the
ordering rule.
For example, in a simple client-server application, each client sends a request to
start a transaction and wait for a reply. If concurrent execution is not enabled, the
transactions will be created and executed one after another sequentially, and requests may
have to wait for their terns in a waiting queue. If the server has the capabilities of
concurrent executing, multiple transactions, requested by different clients, can be
triggered and processed at the same time. Figure 18 illustrates the basic idea.
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Figure 18 Concurrent Execution in a Client-Server Application
Concurrent execution is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it might speed
up the whole system performance in optimal conditions. On the other hand, concurrent
transactions may have to be aborted when conflicts arise. Conflicts may be unavoidable
when concurrent transaction processing is enabled. Some conflicts may be difficult to
discover. In a stateful web application, concurrent transactions must be made equivalent
to a sequential execution, and some transactions may have to be aborted when conflicts
are detected. In the following, we elaborate several common types of conflicts.
The first type of conflicts: A transaction with higher timestamp concludes before
another transaction with lower timestamp, and both transactions update the same piece of
data successfully but in the wrong order. As shown in Figure 19, transaction
before transaction

, (i.e.,

, where
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starts

is the timestamp of the

transaction). They both update a shared data item. It may happen that
shared data item after

updates the

has already committed cause by unexpected delay. In this

case, although the execution of the two transactions is linearizable, the commit order of
the two transactions violates the ordering rule because the transaction that has smaller
timestamp is committed later than the one that has bigger timestamp. If uncontrolled, this
conflict may cause replica inconsistency because it may happen that some replicas
commit Ti ahead of Ti+1 while some other replicas commit Ti+1 ahead of Ti.
Time

Write Oi, v+2 → Oi, v+3

Transaction i
committed

Transaction i
Validate Success
Transaction i+1
committed

Transaction i+1
Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2

Figure 19 Conflict Model 1 – Update Shared Data in the Wrong Order
The second type of conflicts: STM uses commit timestamp to verify the
transaction, and the one with lower timestamp is forced to re-execute due to the
read/write conflicts. In the following example, we consider two concurrent transactions,
transaction

and transaction

earlier than

. When

conflicts with

with

.

accesses the shared data item

finishes its work and tries to commit, it detects the write/write

and this would force

be re-executed. Again, although the two

transactions are executed according to some lienarizable order, the actual order violates
our ordering rule because it may cause replica inconsistency.
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Time

Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+3

Transaction i
Restart

Write Oi, v+2 → Oi, v+3

Transaction i
Transaction i
committed

Conflict
Transaction i+1
committed

Transaction i+1
Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2

Validate Success

Figure 20 Conflict Model 2 – Early Transaction Forced to Abort and Restart
Note that for normal read and write conflicts, the conflict resolution rule defined
by STM to ensure linearizable execution of concurrent transactions is adequate. Figure 21
below shows an example.
Time

Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2
Transaction i
committed

Transaction i
Conflict
Transaction i+1
Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+3

Transaction i+1
Restart

Write Oi, v+2 → Oi, v+3

Transaction i+1
committed
Validate Success

Figure 21 Normal Read and Write Conflicts Example

6.2

Speculative Concurrent BFT

The execution of concurrent transactions makes conflict unavoidable and we have
introduced different types of conflicts in the previous section. The basic read/write and
write/write conflicts have already been discovered and handled dynamically by STM.
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And the most difficult part left for us is to add additional mechanism in the validation
step to detect the violation of our ordering rule.
In this section, we introduce speculative concurrent BFT based on two strategies,
namely, commit barrier, and multi-version speculation with commit barrier.

6.2.1

Commit Barrier

We impose the following rule to detect the conflicts in concurrent stateful
systems:
“When a conflict is detected, the transaction with the smaller timestamp or
sequence number should be committed and, if necessary, the one with the larger
timestamp or sequence number must be aborted and restarted.”
This rule must be abide by no matter how complicated the situation is. The reason
why some transactions are valid for STM but violate our ordering rule is because STM
doesn’t track a specific relative ordering among the transactions. The transactions with
higher sequence number could be committed earlier according to the STM conflict
resolution rule. To prevent this from happening, we introduce a commit barrier, an extra
stage of validation during the commit phase. With the commit barrier, the transaction can
commit only when all transactions with lower sequence numbers have already been
committed, otherwise, it has to wait.
We will reuse the two examples introduced in the previous section to see how to
use the commit barrier to solve the problem. The two conflict models are handled in the
same way during the commit barrier. The transaction
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with higher timestamp or

sequence number reaches the commit point first, however, it cannot commit since we
have a barrier now and transaction
this scenario,

has not committed yet, as shown in Figure 22. In

has to wait. On the other hand, transaction

and, if the validation is successful, it can commit. After
commit barrier releases

. However, when

detected. This would force transaction

continues processing

has fully completed, the

is validated, a conflict will be

to abort and to restart. In second try,

would be able to commit.
Time
Transaction i
committed

Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2'
Transaction i

Validate Success
Conflict
Write Oi, v+2' → Oi, v+3

Commit
Barrier

Transaction i+1

Transaction i+1
committed

Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2
Transaction i+1 Validation
Failed and Restart

Validate Success

Figure 22 The Commit Barrier Solution for our Conflict Models
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6.2.2

Multi-Version Speculation with Commit Barrier

Combining STM with commit barrier, we can guarantee the basic rule cannot be violated.
violated. However, the use of the commit barrier may negatively impact the performance.
As the example shows in
Figure 23, when transaction

touches the shared data the very first time, we

know there will be a conflict. With commit barrier, the problem can be solved but in
efficiently. Hence, we propose another approach – Multi-version.
Time
Transaction i
committed

Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2
Transaction i

Validate Success
Conflict
Commit
Barrier

Transaction i+1

Write Oi, v+2 → Oi, v+3
Transaction i+1
committed

Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2'
Transaction i+1 Validation
Failed and Restart

Validate Success

Figure 23 Commit Barrier Performance Issue
Multi-version has been used in different places. The basic idea is that we keep
multiple versions for shared data instead of a single static one. The multiple versions will
include the last committed and the tentative versions. The last committed version is the
permanent data that has been committed successfully by a transaction. The tentative
version, on the other hand, is the version produced when a data item is updated by
another active transaction that has yet to be committed. Every time the transaction
requires a shared data item, it fetches the most recent version of the data item, even it is
the tentative version. Then the fetched latest version is used in the following operations.
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During the validation step, the transaction has to confirm that the tentative data has
already been committed. If that is not the case, the transaction has to be aborted and
restarted.
Multi-version breaks the isolation property and exposes uncommitted data to all
other active transactions. In our system, we store tentative data associated with the
corresponding sequence number assigned to the transaction. When a transaction accesses
the shared data, it prefers to use the one with the highest sequence number that is lower
than that of the current transaction. If the transaction that produced the tentative version
has been aborted, all transactions that are using the tentative version would also have to
be aborted. Note that the multi-version approach must be used in conjunction with
commit barrier validation to guarantee that the tentative version, if it is used, is
committed before the transactions that accessed the tentative version.
Figure 24 illustrates how to apply the multi-version mechanism to an example
scenario. Transaction
transaction

executes normally and it updates the shared data first. When

accesses the same piece of data, there are two versions and transaction

fetches the tentative version from

, even though it is not permanent. The tentative

version of data will be used in operations of
reaches the commit point before transaction
the mean time, transaction

. Since

takes less time to finish, it

but is blocked by the commit barrier. In

continues its processing and commits after validation which

releases the commit barrier of

. Now instead of normal validation,

verify the data version it used to finally commit. After
tentative version becomes permanent. So

also needs to

has committed successfully, the

can also be committed directly without

restart. By using multi-version, transaction
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can commit right after the

and the

ordering rule will hold. Any conflict would be handled nicely with almost no negative
performance impact.
Time
Transaction i
committed
Transaction i

Validate Success

Write Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2
Commit
Barrier

Transaction i+1

Validate Success

Write Oi, v+2 → Oi, v+3
Transaction i+1
committed

Figure 24 Multi-Version with Commit Barrier
We believe any conflict resolution mechanism must strive to allow transactions to
be committed successfully under normal operations. So that, by applying the multiversion approach, the tentative data used in the following transactions (referred to as
consumer transactions) will eventually be made permanent so that the consumer
transactions can proceed to being committed. This would help increase the system
throughput.
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Time
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Transaction i
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Commit
Barrier
Write Oi, v+2'
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Transaction i+1
committed

Validate Success

Transaction i+1 Validation
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Figure 25 Multi-Version Speculation with Provider Restart
However, in some cases, the transaction that produced the tentative version
(referred to as the provider transaction) may have to be aborted and restarted, and the
tentative data would become invalid. This would force the dependent consumer
transactions to be rolled back and restarted as well. However, we still can, during the
retry of the transactions, use the new tentative data. The performance would still be much
better compared with the single version based approach. Figure 25 (a) and (b) show an
example with a comparison between the two approaches: (1) When only the commit
barrier is enabled and, (2) when both the commit barrier and the multi-version
mechanisms are enabled. In Figure 25 (b), we can see that the transaction
commit right after
abort of

. The only different is that

.
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still can

has to rollback and restart due to

The multi-version approach could make concurrent transaction processing more
efficient provided that the tentative data is generated by the right transaction. If the
tentative data is from a wrong transaction or it has been re-written to, the consumer
transaction would have to be aborted and restarted, as shown in Figure 26. Transaction
and

both utilize the tentative data generated by

.

may take the advantage of

using the tentative version from Ti-1. However, transaction
restarted since the data is overwritten by

would have to be

.

Time
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Transaction i-1
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Write Oi, v+0
→ Oi, v+1

Validate Success
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Write Oi, v+1
→ Oi, v+2

Write Oi, v+0
→ Oi, v+1'

Transaction i+1
committed
Validate Success

Transaction i+1 Validation
Failed and Restart

Figure 26 Multi-Version Speculation with Tentative Data Re-written
These cases show the basic rules how the commit barrier and multi-version
approach works to solve the conflicts. In the next section, we describe how to implement
them in our BFT framework.
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6.2.3

Speculative Concurrent BFT

The combination of commit barrier and multi-version speculation, as described in
previous sections, can solve the conflicts and enable efficient concurrent transaction
processing. We now describe how to implement them in our BFT framework and focus
on system wide scenarios.
In practical systems, we may encounter more complicated scenarios than the
examples shown before. It is possible that a transaction accesses a data item out of order,
such as transaction Ti-1 arrives later than transaction Ti and both of them reads a shared
data item, in which case, the transaction with higher sequence number, transaction Ti
here, would have to be aborted and retried as soon as the out-of-order conflicting
operation is detected. Figure 27 shows an example of how out-of-order situations are
handled by our concurrent BFT framework (denoted as C-BFT) and by a BFT framework
with strict sequential execution of all transactions (denoted as S-BFT). Please note that
the commit barrier ensures that all transactions commit following a total ordering
typically determined based on the order of request arrival. If transactions arrive out of the
order or try to commit out of the order, they have to wait until all transactions with lower
sequence numbers have been committed.
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Figure 27 BFT Framework with Strict Sequential Execution of all Transactions (S-BFT)
and Concurrent BFT Framework (C-BFT) with an Example of How Out-of-order
Situations are Handled

6.3

Concurrent BFT Framework

Our concurrent Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) framework, as shown in Figure
28, supports client-server applications where the server is constructed with software
transactional memory (STM). To take the advantages of separation of agreement and
execution [68], we built the agreement agent and application server separately as a
standalone cluster, so that only

server replicas are needed to tolerate up to
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faulty replicas on the application side. The total ordering of the requests from clients is
ensured by the UpRight agreement cluster [19]. The application servers, in our
implementation, are built on top of the LSA-STM open source library [64] to enable
software transaction memory.

Server Replica
STM Runtime

Server Replica
Clients
STM Runtime

Server Replica
STM Runtime

Agreement Cluster

Application Server Cluster

Figure 28 The Proposed Byzantine Fault Tolerance Framework
Client sends their requests to the agreement cluster. And then the agreement
cluster totally orders the requests and dispatches ordered requests to the application
server replicas. The agreement cluster will be responsible to assign a sequence number to
each batch of requests. Hence, the sequence number cannot be directly used on the
application server side due to the fact that sequence number is based on batches instead
of requests (multiple requests in the same batch will have an identical sequence number).
We use a deterministic algorithm to assign a multi-dimensional monotonically increasing
timestamp to each request and the corresponding transaction. And this timestamp is then
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used to ensure the ordering of each request as well as the transaction triggered by the
request.
The batches of requests are disassembled at each server replica. And the request is
delivered immediately once it is known that it has been totally ordered. We assume that
each request will trigger one and only one transaction at the server replicas. We preallocate a thread pool with the size equals to the number of CPU cores. Each thread in the
pool will handle a request at a time. Since we have fixed number of threads in the pool,
we also build a waiting queue for extra requests. Whenever a thread completes a request,
it will fetch the next one in the queue. This approach could significantly increase the
system performance for servers equipped with multi-core processors. Figure 29
demonstrates the infrastructure in detail.
Application

Reply
Client Request 1
Client Request 2
Client Request 3
Client Request 4

Agreement
Cluster

Ordered Batch of Requests

Disassemble
Batch
Append Requests in
the Queue

Client Request 5

Server Infrastructure

Figure 29 Application Server Infrastructure
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6.4

Implementation and Performance Evaluation

The proposed concurrent Byzantine fault tolerance system is implemented in
Java. We build our agreement cluster based on the UpRight framework [19] for total
ordering the requests from the clients. And on the application server cluster side, we use
the LSA-STM library to enable software transactional memory. A comprehensive
experimental study has been carried out using our research prototype in a Local-Area
Network connected by a Cisco switch. The testbed consists of 14 HP BL460c blade
servers and 18 HP ProLiant DL320 G6 servers. Each BL460c server has two Xeon E5405
2.0GHz quad-core processor and 5GB RAM. Each DL320 G6 server is equipped with
one Xeon E5620 2.4GHz quad-core processor and 8GB RAM. All servers are running the
64-bit Ubuntu Server Linux operating system.
The basic structure of the test application is a client-server module where the
server is supported by our concurrent BFT framework. The agreement server is replicated
with

replicas and the application server is replicated with

tolerate up to

replicas to

faulty replicas in each cluster. Each replica is deployed at a different node

in our testbed. In our experiments, we use

because of limited resources, i.e., 3

application server replicas and 4 agreement replicas. All the server replicas are deployed
on the BL460c blade server nodes, and the clients are deployed on the DL320 server
nodes.
A pre-allocated pool of 8 threads is used to perform concurrent execution. This is
to match two quad-core CPUs of each application server replica. The transactions may be
aborted and retried; however, it will eventually be committed.
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The server maintains a shared data pool with 100 data items, and each transaction
accesses 10 data items and perform write operations on them. The data items are selected
pseudo-randomly according to a predefined sharing rate. For example, a 20% sharing rate
means a transaction will only access 2 items in the shared data pool and another 8 from
its private data items. To characterize non-trivial processing load, a finite processing
delay is artificially introduced at the server for each transaction in the form of busy loops,
i.e., the server executes an empty while loop until the predefined timeout has fired. We
use two types of processing load in our experiments: (1) fixed length, and (2) random
processing delays with a Poisson distribution.
Furthermore, to explain the performance results, we define some symbols here:


C-BFT: Concurrent Byzantine fault tolerance system



S-BFT: Sequential Byzantine fault tolerance system (original BFT system
with all requests processed sequentially one after another)



Fixed-i%: Fixed processing time for each transaction in our BFT framework
(C-BFT) with i% data sharing rate



Poisson-i%: Random processing time with Poisson distribution for each
transaction in our BFT framework (C-BFT) with i% data sharing rate

During the first part of the experiments, we set the fixed processing time for 5ms
and the Poisson distribution with a mean of 5ms. The following scenarios are shown in
Figure 30.
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(1) C-BFT (Fixed-i%): Concurrent BFT with 5ms fixed processing time where i
varies from 0 to 100 with 20 increment. For comparison purpose, S-BFT with
5ms processing time is included.
(2) C-BFT (Poisson-i%): Concurrent BFT with random processing time with the
Poisson distribution with a mean of 5ms. Same as the first test, i changes from
0 to 100 with five equal steps.
The throughput test results are summarized in several figures. Figure 30 shows
the average throughput with respect to different number of concurrent clients under
various C-BFT Fixed scenarios, and the S-BFT scenarios for comparison. Figure 31
shows the throughput performance with respect to different number of concurrent clients
under different C-BFT Poisson scenarios. As expected, the lowest throughput is for the
sequential BFT with no concurrent execution and the highest throughput is observed for
concurrent BFT with 0 percent data sharing rate, owning to the fact that there is no shared
data among transactions. Without shared data, transactions will only work on their own
data and it won’t cause any conflicts. So the best performance is expected in this
scenario. For all other scenarios, the larger sharing rate, the more possibility of getting
conflicts during the operations, which leads to a worse throughput.
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Figure 30 Throughput versus the Number of Concurrent Clients for C-BFT Fixed
Configurations
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Figure 31 Throughput versus the Number of Concurrent Clients for C-BFT Poisson
Configurations.
Figure 32 and Figure 33 show the average and the peak throughput dependency
on the data sharing rate for the three sets of scenarios. It can be seen that the throughput
decreases with a reasonable amount with larger data sharing rates. We use S-BFT as
references in the figure, whose results show as a horizontal line. It makes sense since the
data sharing rate has no impact for sequential processing.
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Figure 32 Average Throughput versus Different Data Sharing Rates.

Figure 33 Peak Throughput versus Different Data Sharing Rates.
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Figure 34 shows the throughput results with the fixed processing time and Poisson
distribution processing time for two scenarios with 0% and 100% sharing rates. As
expected, the scenario with the fixed processing time has better performance. The
performance of the system with Poisson distribution processing times is worse because
the commit barrier causes all transactions to wait for the previous ones to complete. For
the fixed processing time situation, the later one can commit immediately if there is no
conflicts detected. However, for dynamic processing time, if one transaction takes longer
time, all the followings transactions would be impacted, as shown in Figure 35 and
Figure 36.

Figure 34 Throughput versus the Number of Concurrent Clients for Comparing Fixed and
Poisson Distribution Processing Time.

91

Time

C-BFT Fixed
Transaction i

Transaction i started later
than transaction i+1

Transaction i
committed

Transaction i+1

Transaction i+1 committed
after retry

Transaction i+1
started

Transaction i+2

Transaction i+2
started

Transaction i
committed

Figure 35 Concurrent BFT with Fixed Processing Time under Normal Operations
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Figure 36 Concurrent BFT with Poisson Distributed Processing Time under Normal
Operations
To study the inner workings of the system, we profile the number of conflicts and
aborts, in addition to the number of commits in each run. Each of clients sends 100,000
requests consecutively with a pre-defined data sharing rate. We recorded the total number
of commits, conflicts and aborts, and then calculated the conflict rate and abort rate. The
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profiling results of abort rate and conflict rate for C-BFT fixed scenarios are shown in
Figure 37 and Figure 38. And the profiling results for C-BFT Poisson scenarios are
shown in Figure 39 and Figure 40. From the figures, we can see that the conflict and
abort rates increase exponentially with the number of concurrent clients, and with the
sharing rates. This makes sense since both the larger data sharing rate and the more
concurrent clients are dedicated more chances of conflicts.
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Figure 37 Conflict Rate in Terms of Average Number of Conflicts per Transaction versus
Different Number of Concurrent Clients.

Figure 38 Abort Rate in Terms of Average Number of Aborts per Transaction versus
Different Number of Concurrent Clients.
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Figure 39 Conflict Rate in Terms of Average Number of Conflicts per Transaction versus
Different Number of Concurrent Clients.

Figure 40 Abort Rate in Terms of Average Number of Aborts per Transaction versus
Different Number of Concurrent Clients.
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Furthermore, as shown in Figure 41 and Figure 42, the abort rate for dynamic
processing time is higher than that for the fixed processing time regardless of sharing rate
and number of concurrent clients, which are already explained in Figure 35 and Figure
36.

Figure 41 Abort Rates Observed for Different Sharing Rate
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Figure 42 Abort Rates Observed for 10 Concurrent Clients with Different Data Sharing
Rates
The test results shown above confirm that indeed the performance is significantly
improved with our proposed concurrent BFT system compared with sequential BFT in all
circumstances tested. The throughput improvement ranges from 28%, when data sharing
rate is 100%, to 125%, when data sharing rate is 0%. From the performance evaluation
results, we can make the following conclusions:
(1) Smaller data sharing rates lead to better throughput;
(2) Fixed processing time for each transaction leads to better throughput.
Both can be easily explained. When the data sharing rate gets higher, it is more
likely that some transactions will involve conflicting operations and some of the
transactions will be aborted and retried. Furthermore, if a transaction is aborted and
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retried, all others with higher sequence numbers would have to be delayed, or possibly be
aborted and retried also, until the current one is committed eventually. Therefore, the
performance of the system with smaller data sharing rate will be better than the one with
a larger sharing rate. It also makes sense that the throughput is better when all
transactions take similar amount of time to complete. When the processing time to
complete a transaction follows the Poisson distribution, the wait-to-commit time will be
impacted by a slow transaction. All later transactions would have to wait for the slowest
transaction to complete before they can commit. Hence, the performance is reduced. On
the other hand, when transactions take the same amount of time to complete, the next
one, if there is no conflict, can be committed immediately with minimized overhead.
In Figure 32, it is also interesting to see that the reduction in throughput with
more concurrent clients and higher data sharing rates is less than one would have
expected. This is because when the aborted transactions are retried, they are still
processed concurrently.

6.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented our software transactional memory (STM) based
concurrent Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) framework to maximize the performance by
allowing concurrent processing. The strategies are based on two ideas: (1) commit
barrier, which is used to commit concurrent transactions according to a assigned total
order, and (2) multi-version speculation (works with commit barrier), which allows the
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tentative data to be used in later transactions. In essence, the dependencies between
concurrent transactions can be discovered and handled dynamically by using the software
transactional memory during runtime. If there is no conflict, transactions will be
processed concurrently and committed according to the total order of the requests. When
conflicts re detected, some transactions may have to be aborted and retried. And
eventually, all transactions will be committed successfully. Furthermore, some of the
conflicts can in fact be resolved without aborting transactions in the multi-version
approach.
A comprehensive performance evaluation of our proposed speculative and
concurrent BFT framework is carried out to characterize the effectiveness and limitations.
The results show that the overall system performance is significantly increased even in
the worst case with every transaction has 100% data from shared data pool. Furthermore,
we observed that the throughput not only depends on the data sharing rate, but also the
distribution of the processing time.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this chapter, I summarize my main research contributions in this dissertation
and outline some future work. My main contributions include:


The classification of common types of replica nondeterminism and a set of
mechanisms to control replica nondeterminism in the context of Byzantine
fault tolerance computing,



A migration-based proactive service recovery scheme to support long-running
Byzantine fault tolerance systems and,



A set of mechanisms to enable concurrent Byzantine fault tolerant execution
of requests based on the software transactional memory model.

The future work will focus on extending my current mechanisms to further reduce
the probability of conflicts among concurrent operations and hence facilitate even higher
system throughput.
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7.1

Conclusion

BFT algorithm is a promising technique to utilize redundancy resources to
tolerance Byzantine faults for stateful system. However, the existing BFT algorithms [13,
14, 15, 16, 20, 68] lack the mechanisms to deal with many common types of
nondeterministic operations. Such algorithms also require the requests to be executed
sequentially to achieve strong replica consistency. Additionally, the assumption of only
one-third of the service replicas can be faulty is impossible to hold without additional
mechanisms because an adversary would continuously attempt to compromise more
replicas over time. To address this concern, several proactive recovery schemes have
been proposed [13, 15, 48, 53, 54, 55]. However, they all have the following issues:


They rely on the rebooting to repair a replica, which may not be effective if
hardware components are damaged;



They may introduce artificial unavailability during a round of proactive
recovery;



They lack mechanisms to coordinate the replicas during a round of proactive
replica such that only a small portion of replicas can undergo recovery at any
time.

In this dissertation research, we aimed to address all the issues identified above.
First, we provided a classification of common types of replica nondeterminism, and
introduced a set of mechanisms to handle these types of nondeterminism systematically.
If the type of nondeterminism is non-verifiable pre-determinable (NPRE), an extra phase,
which we refer to as the pre-prepare-update phase, is used to control the nondeterminism.
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The idea is to let every replica contributes its share of nondeterministic values to prevent
a faulty replica from dominating the final value, which could compromise the system
integrity. For verifiable post-determinable nondeterminism (VPOST) and non-Verifiable
post-determinable nondeterminism (NPOST), we have to add a whole round of Byzantine
agreement in the post-commit phase to ensure that correct replicas could reach an
agreement on the nondeterministic values. Additionally, to prevent the system from
crashing, we provisioned a separate monitoring thread for NPOST as governance just in
case the main execution thread crashes or hangs.
Second, we presented a service migration based proactive recovery approach. The
three issues we pointed out earlier are resolved by the following means: (1) remove the
time-consuming recovery step out of the critical path and involve system administrator, if
necessary, to fix the problems manually; (2) use a dynamically adjustable service
migration interval based on the observed system load and system availability
requirements; (3) provide extra resources as standby node pool and use a registration
protocol for replica coordination on the membership of standby nodes.
Third, we proposed to use software transaction memory based concurrent
execution to lift the limitation of sequential processing and significantly improved the
system performance. In our approach, multiple requests are executed concurrently and
the commit order is controlled based on the total ordering of incoming requests.
Furthermore, multi-version is utilized to pre-execute the requests and hold the result
temporarily until the execution is validated. This scheme may significantly reduce the
conflict rate of concurrent operations, which is essential to achieve better system
throughput.
102

7.2

Future Work

We have shown that speculative concurrent BFT indeed can significantly improve
the performance of the replicated system. However, if we can further classify the write
operations, we can make it even better.
The idea hinges on the write operations. We observe that the write operations can
different impact based on their relationship with operation history. If we further classify
the write operations to history related and history unrelated. It will reduce the possibility
of conflicts, which would lead to further performance improvement.
The number of conflicts is the key factor of STM performance. Fewer conflicts,
with no doubt, will lead to better throughput. After further classification, even if a history
unrelated write operation is followed by any other writes, it won’t cause write/write
conflict, which will decrease the number of conflicts and hence further improve the
performance of whole system. We call it the improved STM solution.
We still use the multi-version based approach similar to LSA-STM [60] and make
a tentative value transparent. Later operations can see a tentative value and will use it for
its own. When multiple transactions access the same piece of data concurrently, improved
STM will resolve the conflicts and guarantee the most important rule of concurrence
serializability.
Based on the history relationship, we define two types of write operations, history
related write and history unrelated write. The read operations are as usual.
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Read: Based on the sequence number, the read operation should always return
the most up-to-date value of the data accessed.



History Related Write: The write operation relies on the previous data value.
This type of operations needs the data values from previous transactions and
must be executed in the order as determined by the sequence number. A
history related write is always preceded with a read operation on the same
data item.



History Unrelated Write: A write operation simply writes a new value to the
data item, regardless of the previous value. A history unrelated write may be
executed immediately after the commit barrier, even though there might be
unrelated conflicts. Although the value of the previous operation may be
overwritten immediately, that operation still have to be carried out since other
operations in between may access the data. History unrelated writes can be
identified when there is no prior read operation on the same data item in the
same transaction.

7.2.1

Conflicts Model Revisited

We have already discussed the conflicts model in section 6.1 and knew that
conflicts management plays a very import role during concurrent control. Now let’s get
into details about how we will take advantage of the classification of the write operations.
In the following description, the symbol ‘/’, is used as a separator to indicate which
operation happens first with no concern about the sequence number assigned to the
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transaction. For example, read/write means read happens before write. This read
operation may or may not come with a lower sequence number.

When we have write/write scenarios, we focus on the one with higher sequence
number and will take different actions based different types of write operations it.


History Related Write: If the history related write comes with higher sequence
number and happens after the other write operation, the read operation, in read
and write pair, will take the tentative value from the cache and use it in the
following history related write. As normal transaction, the commit has to wait
until all previous transactions have completed. If the write with a lower
sequence number is executed later, write/write conflict occurs and the
transaction with history related write operation has to be aborted and restarted
as shown in Figure 43.
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Figure 43 Write/History Related Write


History Unrelated Write: Two history unrelated writes do not conflict with
each other. If a write with a lower sequence number happens first, the history
unrelated write can simply re-write with a new version of the data item. On
the other hand, if the history unrelated write comes with a larger sequence
number but executes first, it will write to the tentative cache value until the
validation is succeeded. This is an unrelated conflict which doesn’t need to
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abort the later transaction. Please note that all transactions with lower
sequence numbers that are executed later than the history unrelated write must
still be committed first.

Time
Transaction i
committed

Write Oi, v+1
Transaction i
No Conflicts

Validate Success

Transaction i+1
History Unrelated Write Transaction i+1
Oi, v+2
committed

Time

Write Oi, v+1

Transaction i
committed

Transaction i
Unrelated Conflict

Validate Success

Transaction i+1
History Unrelated
Write Oi, v+2

Transaction i+1
committed

Figure 44 Write/History Unrelated Write
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7.2.2

Improved Concurrent Speculative BFT

In previous section, we revisited the conflicts model and outlined a solution that
could further reduce the conflicts. By further classifying the write operations, we can see
that some conflicts originally exist are gone. Now let’s apply this approach to a more
complicated case as shown in Figure 45.
Time

Read Oi, v
Ti committed

Transaction i

History Related Write
Transaction i+1
Conflicts

History Related Write
Transaction i+2

History Related Write

Oi, v → Oi, v+2

Oi, v+1 → Oi, v+2'
Restart
Read Oi, v+2'

Read Oi, v+2
Transaction i+3

Ti+1 committed

Oi, v → Oi, v+1

Ti+2 committed
History Related Write
Ti+3 committed

Oi, v+2' → Oi, v+3

Tentative value

Tentative value

Unrelated
Conflicts
Transaction i+4

Read Oi, v+3
Ti+4 committed
Tentative value

History Unrelated Write
Commit Barrier

Transaction i+5
Conflicts

Transaction i+6

Ti+5 committed

Oi, v+4
Restart

Read Oi, v+2

Read Oi, v+4

Tentative value

Tentative value

Commit Barrier

Ti+6 committed

Figure 45 A Complicated Example with Improved Speculative Concurrent BFT
There are 7 current transactions with sequence numbers range from to
Transaction only contains a read operation. Transaction
write to the data

and updates it to version

without any problem. Transaction
data and happens before transaction

.

involves a history related

. This transaction could be committed

also performs a history related write on the same
. It causes a conflict and transaction
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have

to be aborted and restarted, which would also affect transaction

since it reads the

tentative data from transaction

. Both transactions are eventually committed after

they are restarted. Transaction

has only a read operation using the tentative value

from transaction

, and it can be committed successfully. Transaction

executed earlier than transaction

. Transaction

gets

involves a history unrelated

write operation. Although the transaction with a lower sequence number i+3 wrote to the
same data later than the transaction with
transaction

abort. The only thing is that transaction

barrier until transaction
than

, the unrelated conflict wouldn’t cause
is blocked at the commit

is committed. The last transaction

came even earlier

, and it reads the invalid data initially, and hence, it must be aborted and

restarted. During the re-execution of the transaction, it accessed the correct value. As can
be seen, with the write operations further classified, transaction

is committed

without having to be restarted.
Although we believe this improved speculative concurrent BFT will further
improve the performance. More investigation is necessary to establish its theoretical
foundation and to demonstrate its effectiveness for practical applications in the future
work.
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